The origins of meaning – from pragmatic control signals to semantic representations
The concept of representations is widely used across the cognitive sciences, but its meaning is highly contested. Representations are often thought of as “vehicles” with “content” – that is, internal physical patterns that are correlated with some state of affairs and that usefully convey that state of affairs to the rest of the neural system or the cognitive economy at large. This raises a number of problems: how does an internal pattern come to be correlated with something else? How does the rest of the system know what the pattern means? How does the system know what to do with that information? I suggest that thinking of representations as vehicles with content presents a stumbling block to answering these questions. Instead, thinking of them simply as meaningful patterns offers a more naturalistic framework for understanding their roles in perception, behavioural control, and cognition. Meaning is not contained within a vehicle – it is relational, contextual, and interpretive. Her