• Mashup Score: 0

    The persistent gap between need and access for evidence-based mental healthcare has spurred considerable interest in the development of disseminable, efficacious, and cost-effective stand-alone approaches and adjunctive interventions. Computerized cognitive trainings, which originated in the experimental psychopathology literature, have gained considerable attention as a possible approach for addressing this need-to-access gap. In this Perspective, we describe the current state of the literature on computerized cognitive training interventions for psychopathology. Drawing on longstanding principles from learning theory and cognitive psychology, we discuss several reasons why many of these interventions (e.g., cognitive bias modification) have not yet achieved their considerable potential as cost-effective, scalable, and effective digital therapeutics. We also consider distinguishing features that may help to explain why some computerized cognitive training programs (e.g., cognitive rem

    Tweet Tweets with this article
    • Cognitive Training for Mental Health Problems: Pitfalls, Promises, and Paths Forward https://t.co/EoiZZhbOOL via @LaurenSHallion et al https://t.co/ugdwFooTqe

  • Mashup Score: 13

    Engram labelling and manipulation methodologies are now a staple of contemporary neuroscientific practice, giving the impression that the physical basis of engrams has been discovered. Despite enormous progress, engrams have not been clearly identified, and it is unclear what they should look like. There is an epistemic bias in engram neuroscience towards characterising biological changes, while neglecting the development of theory. However, the tools of engram biology are exciting precisely because they are not just an incremental step forward in understanding the mechanisms of plasticity and learning, but because they can be leveraged to inform theory on one of the fundamental mysteries in neuroscience—how and in what format the brain stores information. We do not propose such a theory here, as we first require an appreciation for what is lacking. We outline a selection of issues in four sections from theoretical biology and philosophy that engram biology and systems neuroscience gen

    Tweet Tweets with this article
    • RT @TJRyan_77: If engrams are the answer, what is the question? New paper by @fmosullivan at @tcddublin. https://t.co/neQOzzAj67 via @OSF…

  • Mashup Score: 0

    Progress in the treatment of psychopathology has slowed and much remains unknown about how treatments achieve their beneficial effects. We propose that computational models can be used to provide new insights into how treatments work and how they can be improved. We argue that treatments are best understood as interventions on systems of interacting components, and that computational models are needed if we are to accurately and precisely determine the effect an intervention will have on this system. We demonstrate this approach by using a computational model of panic disorder to conduct an in silico dismantling study of cognitive behavioral therapy. This simulated trial allows us to: identify a common source of treatment failure; propose a revised treatment protocol that mitigates this source of failure; and demonstrate that, if the model is accurate, this revised protocol will lead to improved treatment outcomes for 10% of patients. We conclude with a discussion of the promise and ch

    Tweet Tweets with this article
    • Improving Treatments for Mental Disorders using Computational Models https://t.co/SC5Nh0q5Xn via @Oisin_Ryan_ et al https://t.co/bzw3BNdLTi

  • Mashup Score: 4

    Some colleagues have questioned about our recent joint statement (Fleming et al 2023), so I try to address them here, as well as to provide some background. I also discuss what I think really went wrong with the recent adversarial collaboration on testing theories of consciousness (ARC-Cogitate), which has in part led to the statement. In a previous open review I already discussed the scientific content of their recent preprint. Here I focus on the institutional context, from my own personal perspective, as someone familiar with both the project itself and several other related (ongoing) projects in the field. There are issues that concern more than the subfield of consciousness science alone; advocates of open science, cognitive neuroscience, and theories in neurobiology in general may also benefit from some awareness of these problems, as they may end up spreading to and reflecting badly on the broader scientific community – if we do not make an effort to address them together.

    Tweet Tweets with this article
    • What is a Pseudoscience of Consciousness? Lessons from Recent Adversarial Collaborations https://t.co/GVfowHP659 via @hakwanlau https://t.co/NJV3dF6y0o

  • Mashup Score: 0

    The media, including news articles in both Nature and Science, have recently celebrated the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) as a ‘leading’ and empirically tested theory of consciousness. We are writing as researchers with some relevant expertise to express our concerns.

    Tweet Tweets with this article
    • The Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness as Pseudoscience https://t.co/RW76fBhOgP via @HeleenASlagter et al https://t.co/jzEPgsTiyl

  • Mashup Score: 3

    Recent developments in the causal inference literature have renewed psychologists’ interest in how to improve causal conclusions based on observational data. A lot of the recent writing has focused on concerns of causal identification (under which conditions is it, in principle, possible to recover causal effects?); in this primer, we turn to causal estimation (how do we actually turn the data into an effect estimate?) and modern approaches to it that are commonly used in epidemiology. First, we explain how causal estimands can be defined rigorously with the help of the potential outcomes framework, and we highlight four crucial assumptions necessary for causal inference to succeed (exchangeability, positivity, consistency, and non-interference). Next, we present three types of approaches to causal estimation and compare their strengths and weaknesses: propensity score methods (in which the independent variable is modeled as a function of controls), g-computation methods (in which the

    Tweet Tweets with this article
    • The Causal Cookbook: Recipes for Propensity Scores, G-Computation, and Doubly Robust Standardization https://t.co/6UfyvRlhx2 via @dingding_peng & @ArthurChatton @PWGTennant @vk_wilde https://t.co/56TtGzL0hn

  • Mashup Score: 0

    Misinformation remains a serious problem and continues to be a major focus of intervention efforts. Psychological inoculation – a popular intervention approach wherein people are taught to identify manipulation techniques – is being adopted at scale around the globe by technology companies in an effort to combat misinformation. Yet the efficacy of this approach for increasing belief accuracy remains unclear, as prior work has largely focused on technique identification – rather than accuracy judgments – using synthetic materials that do not contain claims of truth or falsity. To address this issue, we conducted 5 studies with 7,286 online participants using a set of news headlines based on real-world false and true content in which we systematically varied the presence or absence of emotional manipulation. Although an emotional manipulation inoculation video did help participants identify emotional manipulation (replicating past work), there was no carry-over effect to improving partic

    Tweet Tweets with this article
    • Misinformation inoculations must be boosted by accuracy prompts to improve judgments of truth https://t.co/uMit0UTnT7 via @GordPennycook et al https://t.co/hLRGSMk1AT

  • Mashup Score: 0

    Self-nudging interventions enable people to redesign their own environment to encourage choices that are in line with their goals and preferences. Self-nudging is particularly relevant online, where users’ autonomy is endangered by deceptive design and opaque algorithms. To date, experimental research on self-nudging interventions to confront online challenges is scarce. In this pre-registered experimental study (N = 965), participants in the self-nudge condition were informed about a nudge to reduce misinformation sharing and actively decided for or against its implementation during the study; participants in the nudge condition received the nudge without such information nor the option to choose. Both the self-nudge and the nudge increased sharing discernment, but the effect of the self-nudge was stronger. Beside developing an experimental methodology to test self-nudging in a controlled setting, this study provides evidence for the potential of self-nudging to avoid paternalism in t

    Tweet Tweets with this article
    • An Accuracy Self-Nudge to Reduce Misinformation Sharing Online https://t.co/5HEZWxAf5C via @fc_stock et al

  • Mashup Score: 1

    The concept of representations is widely used across the cognitive sciences, but its meaning is highly contested. Representations are often thought of as “vehicles” with “content” – that is, internal physical patterns that are correlated with some state of affairs and that usefully convey that state of affairs to the rest of the neural system or the cognitive economy at large. This raises a number of problems: how does an internal pattern come to be correlated with something else? How does the rest of the system know what the pattern means? How does the system know what to do with that information? I suggest that thinking of representations as vehicles with content presents a stumbling block to answering these questions. Instead, thinking of them simply as meaningful patterns offers a more naturalistic framework for understanding their roles in perception, behavioural control, and cognition. Meaning is not contained within a vehicle – it is relational, contextual, and interpretive. Her

    Tweet Tweets with this article
    • And that’s all I have to say about that (here). See the preprint for more https://t.co/pPUjTfRfui... 13/13 https://t.co/VZGSNpLlLx

  • Mashup Score: 1

    Background Major depressive disorder (MDD) is a heterogeneous mental disorder. International guidelines present overall symptom severity as the key dimension for clinical characterisation. However, additional layers of individual differences may reside within severity levels related to differences in how symptoms interact with one-another in a given patient, referred to as symptom dynamics. We investigate these individual differences by estimating the proportion of patients that display differences in their symptom relationship patterns while sharing the same overall symptom severity. Methods Patients with MDD recruited at four centres in the Netherlands between 2016-2018 rated their baseline symptom severity using the Inventory for Depressive Symptomatology Self-Report (IDS-SR). Momentary indicators for symptoms were collected through Ecological Momentary Assessments scheduled to measure each patient five times per day for 28 days. Each patient’s symptom dynamics were estimated using

    Tweet Tweets with this article
    • Towards precision in the diagnostic profiling of patients: leveraging symptom dynamics in the assessment of major depressive disorder https://t.co/J5l2Mwu5gC via @OmidVEbrahimi et al